Power in International Relations

Written by: Rooman Ahmed (M.Phil. Scholar at Strathclyde University)

Proofread and Edited: Noor Ul Tehseen (Graduated from National University of Modern Languages)

Reading time: 25 Minutes 

The following written account explores the definition of power and its evaluation metrics discussing the United States defeat at the hands of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

After the USA's withdrawal from Afghanistan, many quickly iterated that the "American century is over" (Borger, 2021). However, is American century really over? History shows that all-powerful empires have a limited period. They grow, develop, reach their peak, and then wither. 

The British Empire, for example, had a strong foothold that spanned across the world's continents for over four hundred years. It was said that 'the sun never sets on the Empire.' However, great power falters once its material assets wane (as was the case of the British Empire) (Borger, 2021 August), and the sun eventually did set on the kingdom after World War II. This shows that power is not static but rather a dynamic phenomenon. It only concentrates in one place or state for a while.

Furthermore, historical evidence has shown small nations ousting big powers. For example, the forces of Ho Chi Minh successfully defeated the American forces in the Vietnam War. The spectre of that war continued to haunt the U.S. when it invaded Afghanistan (which will be discussed later). Apart from the robust Vietnamese response, public opinion in the USA was also against the war. The mounting public pressure and the heavy U.S. casualty are significant reasons for the USA's withdrawal from Vietnam. (Gelpi, 2017)

Similarly, another small power in the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979, the Afghan Mujahedeen, was able to overcome the Soviet forces. However, it is known that the Soviet adversaries supported these forces monetarily. The Afghans were funded, and the CIA and ISI, the USA and Pakistan intelligence agencies trained the Mujahedeen. The aim of the USA in the Soviet-Afghan war was clearly to defeat the USSR. At the height of the cold war, this violent clash between two powerful entities used Afghanistan as its battleground. 

Not even a single factor led to the defeat of the USSR, though the most remarkable one was the economic issue prevailing in the country. In order to maintain a strong military, the state also needed to have a firm grip over the economy – which the Soviet Union lacked. (Kissenger, 1995)

Eventually, the Soviet Union was defeated by a much smaller force (although it is crucial to remember that this force was aided and trained by a world superpower), and the title of the world's most powerful nation was bestowed on the USA. This example further reinforces that power is a changing notion.

Power is defined as a combination of many variables comprising tangible and intangible elements through which its energy is channelized. Tangible elements comprise quantifiable and measurable ingredients such as population, military resources, the government's economic and financial position, and the rate of advancement in technology, research and development. Moreover, intangible elements like robust and resilient leadership and high morale are required to harness the energy of these tangible aspects. (Rourke, 2012). Power is not just about the 'resources' at hand but also about the 'outcomes' and 'control over actors'. (Hart, 1976) Nevertheless, are the resources turning into outcomes that one envisages to see? Furthermore, does the state has the power of control over actors?

In international relations, 'power' is the most critical entity. There are usually two types of power at play: 'hard power', which is pure military power, and 'soft power', which is the power of persuasiveness. (Rourke, 2012). However, a new type known as 'smart power' is also making ground. 

Therefore, the word 'power' is a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional concept. One of the classic definitions of power is 'the ability to influence others and yet be capable enough to resist the unwelcome influence of others.' (Rourke, 2012)The former part of this definition can unanimously be agreed upon, but the latter half is highly debatable. In a highly globalized world, a state cannot resist the influence of others. Each entity is influencing the other, whether subtly or coercively. Each state and entity shapes and affects us in one way or another.

In light of this extensive discussion on the definitions, types, and intricacies of power, this essay will now explore power in the context of the USA's defeat in Afghanistan. 

The USA's war with Afghanistan is the longest ever fought. The genesis of the war is traced back to the attacks on World Trade Centre by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001. A non-state actor challenged the world's most powerful entity. Hence, the world entered a new warfare type that hosted 'state' versus 'non-state' actors. 

The war in Afghanistan began only three weeks after the September 11 attack. Therefore, the U.S.'s rational grand planning or strategy when it invaded Afghanistan is highly questionable (King, 2022). Was that objective short-term or long-term? The military prowess of the USA stood unmatched in the face of the Taliban – the world's best army was to confront a trivial band of tribal men. (Bruce, 2021) 

The goal at first was to disband the Taliban and destroy the counter-insurgency of Al-Qaeda, which the USA achieved through aerial bombardment. Nevertheless, then the U.S.'s aim and scope of the war expanded. The war, which aimed to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda, turned into a nation-building project and transformed the country into a semi-democracy. This is where the problem began. Scholars state that the U.S. objective was 'absurd' and the strategy was doomed from the beginning. Changing centuries-old traditions is different from what the USA set out to do. So, the objective could have been more suitable, feasible, and acceptable. (Bruce, 2021)

Yes, the USA had power over resources to build the infrastructure, houses, and roads in Afghanistan. However, it could not overturn the characteristics of the society, which was deeply divided, fractured, and patriarchal. The first failure that came to shore was needing to understand the cultural traditions of the country into which the USA stepped (Williams, 2022). Apart from the cultural environment, the geographical terrain of the country is also essential. Afghanistan sits in a highly rugged mountainous region and is a landlocked state. The country's location is an asset for guerilla warfare that the Taliban masterfully carry out. (King, 2022)

In strategic studies, the centre of gravity consists of space, mass, and time. 'Space' indicates the battleground – the U.S. did not have a grasp or clear understanding of the battleground in Afghanistan. The 'mass' was the army, which the USA had in abundance and was able to train the local Afghan population as well. Lastly, did the U.S. have time? They aimed to carry out a swift operation, yet this was the longest war in U.S. history, spanning the reign of four presidents and two whole decades. The U.S. was determined to leave, while the Taliban had no time restrictions. They are credited to have said, 'You have the watches, but we have the time.' (Anderson, 2011) 

Literature analysis of the war suggests many reasons for the USA's failure in Afghanistan. The most important reasons have been briefly discussed above and will be elaborated on in the following account. 

The first and foremost reason is the need for more clarity on the USA's aims in Afghanistan (M. Stevens, 2021). As stated above, the USA's mission kept changing. Not having a definite strategy in the mind of the politicians led to chaos. At first, it was to defeat the Taliban. Then, they wanted to place a democratic government, change the Afghan culture and emphasize women's education (Whitlock, 2019). However, neither the culture nor the norms changed overnight. The one trillion dollars that the USA invested in Afghanistan for nation-building did not achieve any of the fruitful targets or aims it set out to achieve. The primary issue was their goal – was it a suitable objective to fulfil in a profoundly patriarchal country?  

Moreover, the USA needed to have clearly defined adversaries. Were they hunting the Taliban or the Al-Qaeda? Was Pakistan a friend or a foe? Not having these clear demarcations before involving themselves in the most significant conflict in the region posed their downfall. They did not delineate who the enemies were. This indicates the lack of clarity in the military high commanders and that the USA had no feasibility report. As stated above, the spectre of Vietnam did hover over the U.S. as the Bush administration had apprehensions that they might be in a quagmire like that of the Vietnam War. (Whitlock, 2019)

On the contrary, when the USA does have precise aims that it sets out to achieve – like in the US-led intervention in Bosnia and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord – they are internationally lauded and come out victorious. The U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, had said, 'If we use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation.' (Borger, 2021 August)

Comparing these two situations shows that when the USA knows about the targets and aims it wishes to achieve, it leads to appreciation. However, when the objectives could be more precise, as in Afghanistan, it ends up with a failure on the record.  

Since 2001, more than 775,000 U.S. troops have repeatedly deployed to Afghanistan. Of those, 2,300 died there, and 20,589 were wounded in action, according to Defense Department figures. (Whitlock, 2019)

According to the Washington Post report on the Afghan papers, the de-classified documents, and the interviews and testimonies of the high officials involved in the administration of the Presidents, they realized that the USA has no idea the 'mess it has put itself into'. (Whitlock, 2019) The objectives of the Taliban were clearly to expel the U.S. from their land (King, 2022), while the USA's aims were a mystery. 

Although the U.S. presidents in the public state that they have no intention of nation-building in Afghanistan, they do the contrary. According to the Learned Report, the USA had allocated $133 billion to the Afghanistan nation-building project, which is significantly more than the budget allocated to the post-second world war Marshall Plan for Western Europe. While the notion of nation-building – which includes building infrastructure and administration – was relatively easy in the post second world war Japan and Western Germany, the same target could not be achieved in Afghanistan. This is because the country is structured differently. The culture and norms vary. What is applicable in one part of the world may not work elsewhere. The nation-building notion is not magic syrup a state can consume and adapt to. It is an arduous process that a country has to undergo. Therefore, the U.S. model of nation-building fell victim to its own 'one-size-fits-all' pathology. 

Another aspect of the lack of a clear plan by the U.S. is that it needed to consider the main stakeholders in Afghanistan. The USA invested heavily in the government, which was first run by Hamid Karzai and then by Ghani. However, Afghanistan's corruption and administration problem was so grave that it bore no fruit for the U.S. and led to a collapse. The amount of money blindly invested in the infrastructure of Afghanistan and the building of the Afghan army ended up in the personal assets of the Afghan government. 

The second reason for the U.S. defeat in Afghanistan is government corruption and inefficiency. The USA invested billions of dollars into Afghanistan, believing that the money would be spent on the right cause. However, it brought high corruption and nepotism at the heart of the problem. (Williams, 2022) The U.S. government's unnecessary spending without a check on where the money is being spent makes the U.S. aid service question, 'Why are we getting so much money? (Whitlock, 2019)' It dawned on the U.S. administration that the Afghan President Hamid Karzai or Abdul Ghani was involved in massive corruption and led the country towards "kleptocracy" (Whitlock, 2019). Corruption was endemic in Afghan society, and the USA's failure to initially recognize the deep entrenchment of this evil turned into a reason for their defeat. The U.S. said in public that these Afghan forces have the calibre to meet the threat and do not require foreign assistance, yet they continued to pour investments into the corrupt Afghan government. When the USA learned about the Afghan administration's ineffectiveness, why did they continue investing in a lost cause?

No mission can be accomplished when the administration organs are drowning in corruption. Half the problems of Afghanistan were "civil in nature", and pumping U.S. money was not helping either. Knowing that the warlords were corrupt to the core, the USA tacitly approved this practice by continuing funding and showed reliance on the warlords and their ill practices.

As corruption seeped through the whole body of the government, people had to resort to the Taliban to remedy their matters. This shows that the locals did trust the Taliban and that the Taliban were effective and active at a grassroots level. (Whitlock, 2019)

Usually, western educated figures of power and their transnational linkages play a crucial role in aligning a country with Western values. For example, Lee Teng Hui, former president of Taiwan (also titled Mr Democracy), studied in the USA and later transformed Taiwan by burying autocratic rule and bringing the country in line with democracy. (Krcmaric, 2017)

Between Presidents Hamid Karzai and Abdul Ghani, the latter was a Western favourite partly due to his Western linkages. Despite this, the U.S. was unable to achieve its desired nation-building outcome through Ghani. The administration's inefficiency and incompetence turned into a failure for the U.S. 

A third reason behind the victory of the Taliban was the incompetency of US-trained Afghan forces. Their capacity and capabilities were weak because most of them were 'drug addicts' (Whitlock, 2019), which highly reduced the efficiency of the soldiers. Although the USA was preparing the Afghan people to be the bulwark against the Taliban, their overall report stated that they were unhealthy people. The USA heavily invested in the Afghan army and believed that after sufficient military training, the Afghan army would take over the baton of security. However, the allegiance of the legions of soldiers lay with the warlords and their elderly tribes, not with the state. (King, 2022)

The Taliban leaders, on the other hand, were cohesive and bonded together. There were fractions in the Taliban as well, though their unity prevailed. 

The last aspect to discuss is having power over resources versus power over outcomes. The U.S. had power over resources: it spent heavily on the Afghan army. It provided them with all the arms and logistics within its capacity, but what it could not inculcate in the Afghan army was the spirit to fight and sheer resilience in the face of the Taliban. Thus, power does have limitations. 

There is no denying that power was asymmetrical in this war. The USA was far more supreme than the Taliban, but the USA must know that they do not have the luxury of choosing their adversary. Control over actors and their behaviour was beyond America's strategy. 'Statistically, it has been observed in asymmetrical conflicts that when the stronger states deploy conventional warfare on the weaker states, all that the weaker states have to do is keep up the resilience. All the weaker state has to do is to remain credible in the field while the strong actor's determination wanes.' This is precisely what the Taliban did. They remained firm and garnered the support of the local people. (Thomas, 2019)

They were successful in doing so because the central government that the coalition forces had set up was so ineffective and incapable of building relations with the local population that the masses eventually resorted to the Taliban in hopes of justice under their leadership. (Thomas, 2019) (Whitlock, 2019) 

Furthermore, cultural literacy (or lack thereof) played an essential role in this war. The U.S. military Cultural Information Operation did not understand the culture and society of the Afghan people. For instance, pamphlets were distributed depicting a Pashtun family and an American family sitting side by side, captioned 'friendship.' For the Americans, this might have been a good strategy, but for the Pashtuns, depicting a woman with her face uncovered violates their culture. The message this sort of pamphlet invokes in the Afghans is that the Americans and the coalition forces aim to devoid them of pardah. Leaflets like this were doing more harm than good. It shows the team's ignorance that initiated this campaign to build bridges between the populations but ended up creating more gulfs between the locals and the invading army. (Thompson H Johnson, 2018)

In conclusion, there was no one reason for the USA's defeat by the Taliban. The U.S. could not grasp the 'centre of gravity' and the rationale behind the war they waged. It overstretched its power. All countries have limitations, and the U.S. may be a superpower of the world, yet its power fell short in Afghanistan. A country can invest billions of dollars yet cannot gain its desired outcomes. It was at war with an adversary with iron-clad resolve and a strong belief in God that helped them prevail over the most powerful military in the world. 

Lastly, the USA is a solid economic powerhouse backed by technological advancement. Nevertheless, sometimes powerful states cannot have the desired goals and objectives they set out to achieve.

References

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4. Rourke, J.T. (2009). International politics on the world stage. 12th International. New York.: McGraw-Hill.
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6. Adolph, R.B. (2021) “Why America Lost the War in Afghanistan,” Atlantisch Perspectief, 45(5), pp. 9–13.
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8. King, A. (2022). "Why Did the Taliban Win?," Armed forces and society, p. 95327.
9. Anderson, T.H. (2011). Bush's wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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